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PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY CASES OF 1960: 2*
BY WILLIAM H. DODDIt
Assisted by Girard N. Evashavik, Robert M. High, David G. Senger,
and Robert J. Woodside
BAILMENTS AND GIFTS
Bailinents
In Johnson v. B. & N., Inc.,1 plaintiff checked his coat in the check
room of defendant's restaurant. Subsequently plaintiff discovered that his
coat was missing. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the superior
court noted that where check room service is an incident of defendant's
business and is necessary for the convenience of his patrons, the resultant
relationship is a mutual benefit bailment, although no charge is made for
the use of the check room. However, even when the bailment is established,
coupled with a demand for the return of the coat and a failure to deliver it,
the burden of proving the loss through defendant's negligence still remains
with the plaintiff. This burden was met when plaintiff showed that the cloak
room was a small room, open to the restaurant except for a "half-gate"
across the doorway and that the cloak room attendant was absent therefrom
at frequent intervals, leaving the contents unguarded.
Swan v. United GMC Truck Inc.2 likewise dealt with burden of proof
in connection with a mutual benefit bailment. In this case a truck and a
tractor were bailed to a motor vehicle shop for repairs. A fire subsequently
occurred in which the bailed articles were damaged. The superior court
set forth the following evidentiary burdens incumbent upon parties plaintiff
and parties defendant in such actions: (1) when the alleged bailor has
proved the bailment, demand and a failure to redeliver, he has established
a prima facie case; (2) to escape liability, the bailee must then show that
his failure to redeliver was due to loss by fire, theft or other casualty free
from fault on his own part; (3) if the bailee's evidence does not disclose a
lack of due care, the bailor must then go forward with evidence to prove that
the loss was due to the bailee's negligence; (4) but, if the bailor's case in
* Part I of the judicial highlight, consisting of cases dealing with future interests,
covenants and estates, and zoning appeared in the last issue.
t Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.A., Dickinson College; LL.B.,
Dickinson School of Law.
1. 190 Pa. Super. 586, 155 A.2d 232 (1959).
2. 192 Pa. Super. 176, 159 A.2d 550 (1960).
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chief established that the bailed articles were damaged or destroyed by a
general fire on the bailee's premises, the bailor must also establish in his
case in chief that the bailee was negligent. In the present case the bailors
showed in their case in chief that the vehicles were damaged in a general fire,
but did not show any negligence on the part of the bailee. In addition, the
bailees established by their evidence that the general fire occurred without
negligence on their part. The verdict should therefore have been directed
for the defendant-bailee.
Taylor v. Philadelphia Parking Authority3 involved the question whether
a car in a garage created a bailment or landlord and tenant relation. A
jewelry firm parked its automobiles by the month in defendant's garage.
Plaintiff informed defendant that they would lock it and retain the keys.
The car was missing from the garage, and when it was recovered, the
jewelry had been stolen. In plaintiff's action in assumpsit to recover the
value of the jewelry, the granting of defendant's motion for a compulsory
non-suit was affirmed by the supreme court on the ground that no bailment
existed. The court relied upon the circumstance that plaintiff's retention of
the keys prevented defendant's acquiring possession of the car.
Gifts
In re Cochran's Estatea was a case of first impression dealing with the
ownership of United States Government Series (E) bonds. These bonds
were registered in the name of decedent or some other named persons
(nieces and nephews). The decedent's husband attempted to have these bonds,
which were purchased completely by decedent and kept in her safe deposit
box, included in the inventory of the estate. The supreme court, following
the majority view, held that they should not become a part of the estate.
The treasury regulations provide that upon the death of either co-owner,
the survivor will be recognized "as the sole and absolute owner of the bond"
and payment will be made only to him. Since these regulations existed at
the time of the purchasing of the bonds, they in effect became a part of the
contract; the rights of the co-owners arose exclusively from this contract
and did not depend upon the existence of a gift from decedent.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Return of Deposit
In Tieri v. Orbell4 the vendee successfully recovered his deposit money.
The agreement was conditional upon the vendee's ability to obtain financing,
but was silent as to the type of financing thus required. In permitting parol
3. 398 Pa. 9, 156 A.2d 525 (1959).
3a. 398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1960).
4. 192 Pa. Super. 612, 162 A.2d 248 (1960).
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evidence to clarify the type of financing envisaged by the agreement, the
court held that reasonable efforts to obtain a twenty year mortgage were
sufficient, and vendee could not be forced to accept a six per cent, eleven
year purchase-money mortgage offered by the vendors. The court took judi-
cial notice that twenty year mortgages on similarly priced homes are customary.
Rykaczewski v. Kerry Homes, Inc.5 likewise allowed the vendee to re-
cover his deposit money. The agreement was also conditional upon the
vendee's ability to obtain financing, but no financing could be obtained.
However, the holder of the escrow funds had subsequently absconded. In
allowing recovery, the court pointed out that the escrow agent was selected
by the vendor, stationed in the vendor's sample home, and authorized to
secure the mortgage and accept deposits. Liability must therefore be borne
by the vendor.
Where the contract of sale called for construction of a house "sub-
stantially similar" to a sample home nearby and the jury found the house as
constructed to be "substantially similar," the vendee's attempt to recover
his deposit money was denied in Laughlin v. Baltalden, Inc.0 The superior
court also stated that a deposit of 1900 dollars, which was less than nine
per cent of the purchase prise, was not a sufficiently large amount to be
considered a penalty rather than liquidated damages.
DAVID G. SENGER
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP
Tenancy by the Entireties
The rights of a judgment creditor concerning land owned by the judg-
ment debtors as tenants by the entireties were considered in Swope v. Turner.'
About two years after the judgment was entered by confession on a note
signed by both the husband and wife, the husband was discharged in bank-
ruptcy. After more than five years had elapsed plaintiffs instituted scire
facias proceedings to revive the lien of the judgment against property which
the debtors owned by the entireties at and since the date the judgment was
originally entered. Since the bankruptcy proceeding involved only the hus-
band, under prevailing law the entireties property did not become part of
the bankrupt estate. Therefor, the husband's discharge from all personal
liability on the judgment in the bankruptcy proceeding would not affect the
lien of the judgment against the land owned by the entireties. Although the
lien was gone after the lapse of five years from the date the judgment was
5. 192 Pa. Super. 461, 161 A.2d 924 (1960).
6. 191 Pa. Super. 611, 159 A.2d 26 (1960).
7. 193 Pa. Super. 217, 163 A.2d 714 (1960).
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entered, nevertheless, the court held that it was subject to revival against the
entireties property.
In Kern v. Finnegan,8 the husband and wife entered into an agreement
whereby the property which they held as tenants by the entireties would
thereafter be held by each of them as tenants in common having undivided
one-half interests and, in the event of the wife's death, her one-half interest in
the property would pass to her sister-in-law. After the wife died the husband
brought an action in equity to have the agreement stricken from the records
and cancelled. The superior court, in adopting the opinion of the lower
court, held that since the agreement did not contain the words "grant and
convey," or either of them, it was not effective to pass a fee simple. The
court also doubted that husband and wife by written declaration could con-
vert a tenancy by entireties into a tenancy in common "with the same force
and legal effect as though this had been done by deed duly executed by the
parties and recorded."
MINERALS
The case of Highland v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania9 involved the
ownership of oil and gas rights. The decision depended upon a complex
chain of title.10 The important thing to note is the supreme court's applica-
tion of the "Dunham Rule." The "Dunham Rule" is that in a reservation or
exception of minerals in a conveyance, a rebuttable presumption arises that
the word "minerals" was not intended to include oil or natural gas. The
court held that the "Dunham Rule" applies not only to reservations and
exceptions but also to grants.
Two cases illustrated different techniques for dealing with dormant
mineral leases which were making title unmarketable.
In White v. Young" the lessor brought an action in equity to terminate
an oil and gas lease. The term of the lease was for "ten years and as long
thereafter as oil and gas were found in paying quantities or rent was paid."
The complaint alleged an abandonment of the lease in that the ten year
term expired in 1955 and for three years thereafter neither oil nor gas was
extracted nor was the rent paid. The superior court rejected the defendant's
contention that the plaintiffs had in ejectment an adequate remedy at law,
and held that "equity had jurisdiction to require defendant to surrender the
lease and to plug the well."
In Pape v. Hughes12 the lease provided a term of five years and for
8. 192 Pa. Super. 611, 162 A.2d 93 (1960).
9. 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960).
10. For a discussion of this case, see 65 DICK. L. REV. 159 (1961).
11. 191 Pa. Super. 338, 156 A.2d 579 (1959).
12. 398 Pa. 436, 158 A.2d 547 (1960).
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such additional longer period as minerals could be found which would be
commercially profitable to mine. The lessor brought an action to quiet title.
Upon appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's determination
that, although there had been no abandonment, the lease expired at the end
of the five year term when minerals were not found that could be removed
profitably for commercial purposes.
The recent case of Wingert v. T. E. Phillips Gas & Oil Co.13 provides
a good example of the care a lessee must take when leasing property which
is held in trust. In this case T. W. Phillips, Jr., in 1917, leased land from
William Wingert for a period of twenty years and for as long thereafter as
oil or gas was produced in paying quantities or for as long as operations for
oil or gas were being conducted. William Wingert died in 1925 leaving this
land to his executors to hold in trust for such period as they should in their
discretion determine, not however to exceed fifty years. The executors, as
trustees, were given power to lease, sell or develop all mineral land. In
1936 the trustees reexecuted the same lease with the defendant, T. W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. In 1952 the trustees sold the property to the plaintiffs.
After having received notice from plaintiffs that the lease was terminated,
defendant drilled a well on the land which produced over four and one-half
million cubic feet of gas per day. The supreme court held that the sale of the
property terminated the trust, and since the lease no longer served the trust, it
too was terminated. The plaintiffs were entitled, on the basis of the doctrine of
unjust enrichment, to an accounting by defendants for one-eighth of the total
production of the gas well.
ROBERT J. WOODSIDE
MORTGAGES AND LIENS
In Marx Realty Improvement Co. v. Boulevard Center, Inc.,14 the
court held that the six month period within which the mortgagee must file a
petition to fix fair value under the Deficiency Judgment Act 5 is computed
from the date of delivery of the deed rather than the date of the sheriff's
sale.
In Home Unity Savings and Loan Association v. Balmas,16 one of two
tracts of realty covered by a blanket mortgage was sold at a judicial sale
subject to the mortgage. The mortgagee later released the remaining parcel
from the mortgage and alleged that the whole unpaid balance of the mortgage
was a lien on the first parcel sold at the judicial sale. The court held the
13. 398 Pa. 100, 155 A.2d 92 (1959).
14. 398 Pa. 1, 156 A.2d 827 (1959).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2621.1-2621.11 (1941).
16. 192 Pa. Super. 542, 162 A.2d 244 (1960).
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first was liable only for paying that proportion of the mortgage debt which
the value of that part bore to the value of the total mortgaged realty.
Charging Liens
An attorney sought to impose a charging lien for professional services
rendered against an award made to his client on an appeal to the court of
common pleas in condemnation proceedings in Redevelopment Authority
of City of Clairton." Petitioner was retained by the plaintiff's brother to
represent both parties in the viewer's proceedings. Petitioner made necessary
trial preparations, hired real estate experts, attended the view, and con-
ducted the trial on behalf of the plaintiff and his brother before the board
of viewers. Although plaintiff was present at the trial before the viewers,
he never told petitioner that he did not desire his services. The court found
that plaintiff did hire the petitioner. The plaintiff retained another attorney
to prepare and try the appeal which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
Since the viewer's hearing was a requisite step in obtaining the ultimate
verdict of the jury, the court held that the charging lien should be allowed.
Another recent case involving an attorney's charging lien is Syme v.
Bankers National Life Insurance Company.'8 Plaintiff's attorney sought to
have the lien imposed on a life insurance policy. The bulk of the proceeds
of the policy were held by the insurance company and payable in monthly
installments over a period of years. Plaintiffs had agreed to pay the attorney
who represented them in their suit on the life insurance policy a contingent
fee of twenty-five per cent payable out of the total insurance proceeds. The
court refused the charging lien upon the ground that "there is no fund in
existence, or payable at the present time by defendants to plaintiffs, in
which the appellants have any interest."
Although this seems a sufficient basis for the denial of the charging
lien, the court proceeded to discuss the provision of the insurance policy
forbidding assignment of proceeds by the beneficiary and the applicable
statute prohibiting the assignment by a beneficiary when the proceeds are
held by the company at maturity.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In the case of Rosenblatt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,'9
plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment to conditionally eject the Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike Commission from land upon which the Commission had
already built highway approaches and ramps, allegedly without first legally
condemning the property. By a resolution passed by the Commission on
17. 191 Pa. Super. 404, 156 A.2d 877 (1959).
18. 400 Pa. 74, 161 A.2d 29 (1960).
19. 398 Pa. 111, 157 A.2d 182 (1959).
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March 4, 1952, a right of way 200 feet wide was taken across plaintiff's land
aggregating 9.18 acres, "together with such additional lands deemed necessary
for ramp approaches . . . gasoline stations, restaurants . . . and other facili-
ties needed for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Turnpike
." A bond was delivered and accepted by plaintiffs covering the described
land. Approximately one year later the Commission mailed plaintiff a
letter with a new description of the property being appropriated, which in-
cluded an additional 68 acres for an interchange, and instructed him to insert
the new description in the bond. After the alteration was made on the bond,
work was commenced by the Commission. In this action plaintiffs contended
that the additional land was never legally condemned.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the Gitlin case 20 for the proposi-
tion that "the taking of the highway as described in the resolution of March
4, 1952, and the subsequent appropriation of additional land for an inter-
change, according to the revised plan delivered to the property owner, came
equally within the intended scope of the resolution's condemnation." It was
further stated that the additional acres for an interchange would be en-
compassed in the term "engineering detail," as defined in Foley v. Beech
Creek Extension R.R. Co.,21 and thus a part of the condemnation. In regard
to the date when damages would be assessed, the additional property was
deemed to have been taken on the date when the Commission delivered its
amended bond to secure payment. Judgment for plaintiff in the ejectment
action was reversed and the complaint dismissed.
The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission was ordered to pay interest
of six percent on an award of viewers in the case of Lichtenstein v. Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike Commission.2 2 In construing the applicab!e statutes, the
court refused to equate the Turnpike Commission with the Commonwealth
as far as being exempt from liability for interest. Although the Commission
is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, it is not its alter ego.
A number of cases involved the measure of damages in condemnation
proceedings. In Frontage, Inc. v. County of Allegheny,2 the property in
question abutted a parkway which the Governor and Secretary of Highways
had indicated they intended to designate as a limited access highway. Such
action, however, not having taken place at the date of the condemnation the
court held it should not affect the measure of damages.
In Sgarlat Estate v. Commonwealth24 the land being condemned was
used as a source of supply in the owner's sand and gravel business and
20. Gitlin v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 384 Pa. 326, 121 A.2d 79 (1956).
21. 283 Pa. 588, 129 Atl. 845 (1925).
22. 398 Pa. 415, 158 A.2d 461 (1959).
23. 400 Pa. 249, 162 A.2d 1 (1960).
24. 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960).
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allegedly had no market value. There was evidence that all (not just the
parcel being condemned) of the land was intrinsically worth a computed
figure in relation to this business before the taking, and a computed lesser
value after the condemnation. The court reiterated that it is the person's
property which is condemned, not his business acumen. Accordingly, the
value of the land for business purposes was not relevant.
In Gilleland v. New York State Natural Gas Corp.2 5 the court held that,
for purposes of damages, speculative prospects could not be considered. Vague
and indefinite evidence was introduced at the trial to the effect that the land-
owner had entertained thoughts about developing his tract into home sites
at some time in the future. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
landowner "may expect compensation for reasonable certainties inherent in
the present, not for chances or future possibilities." A similar result was
reached in the case of MacFerree v. New York State Natural Gas Corp.,
26
where the landowner had made no definite plans for development except
"in my mind."
The permitted cross-examination of a corporate vice-president regarding
the capital-stock tax return valuation of property being condemned was held
to be erroneous in B. & K., Inc. v. Commonwealth.27 Since the actual value
of the land reported on the tax return was greater than the value claimed at
trial, the return was not a declaration against interest. Secondly, since the
"actual value" reported included a total value for the numerous tracts owned
by the corporation, such evidence permitted the jury to speculate on the por-
tion attributable to the tract being condemned. In Olson & French, Inc. v.
Commonwealth2 8 the same evidential problem was resolved in keeping with
the B. & K. case. The court added, however, that the capital stock return
reported not actual value but depreciated book value of property purchased
twelve years before the condemnation. Being an arbitrary accounting figure,
it had no bearing on the issue of fair market value.
Another case on valuation was Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission,29 where condemnee's land was divided into two tracts
by a highway. In the condemnation proceedings, condemnee initially chose
to treat the land as one integrated tract for the determination of damages.
By making this initial election, he thereby waived all rights to introduce
evidence regarding damages to the land considered as two distinct and
separate tracts.
25. 399 Pa. 181, 159 A.2d 673 (1960).
26. 399 Pa. 188, 159 A.2d 677 (1960).
27. 398 Pa. 518, 159 A.2d 206 (1960).
28. 399 Pa. 266, 160 A.2d 401 (1960).
29. 401 Pa. 135, 163 A.2d 86 (1960).
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In In re: Approval of Bond of Peoples Natural Gas Co.,3 0 petitioner
desired to amend its approved bond to show the correct description of a right
of way. The condemnor had marked and staked the property in question,
but had inserted an erroneous property description in the bond. It was held
that only one strip was ever intended to be taken, and that was the strip
marked and staked. The condemnor's petition was not due to a "change of
mind," a change of location or an attempted diminishment of damages:
on the contrary, it was mere correction of a mistake of description and would
harm neither party.
In Commonwealth v. Appointment of Viewers, Etc.3 1 the Common-
wealth exercised its power of eminent domain to take a strip of claimant's
land for slope purposes in connection with construction of curbing. Due to
the curbing, ingress and egress to landowner's business property were so
impeded that it necessitated relocation of the buildings. The Commonwealth
sought to differentiate between its construction of the curbing as an exercise
of its police power and the taking of the land for slope purposes as an
exercise of its power of eminent domain, and thus escape liability for the
relocation of the buildings. Taking a narrow strip of land and constructing
curbs were held to be one transaction, and this, in its entirety, was an exercise
of the power of eminent domain. It was further held that the relocation
damages were direct and not consequential, and were, therefore, compensable.
An optionee of condemned land was held to be entitled to damages for the
loss of his right to purchase in In re Governor Mifflin Joint School Authority
Petition.3 2 The contract, entitled "Agreement of Sale", was conditioned upon
the land being rezoned from residential to business. If the land were rezoned,
optionee was obligated to pay the balance of the purchase price in ten days;
failure of the rezoning attempts gave the purchaser an option to purchase
within twenty days or consider the contract void. Efforts to rezone were un-
successful, but before either party took any further action, the land was
condemned. The court held that since there was no obligation to purchase
after the failure of the borough to rezone, the agreement was an option which
terminated when the land was condemned. An unexercised option does not,
in this instance, work an equitable conversion; the landowner was entitled to
full compensation. The case was remanded for the determination of the value
of the option.
ROBERT M. HIGH
30. 399 Pa. 226, 160 A.2d 391 (1960).
31. 399 Pa. 586, 160 A.2d 715 (1960).
32. 401 Pa. 387, 164 A.2d 221 (1960).
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